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Food Price Rises and Political Instability: Problematizing a Complex 
Relationship 
Leila Demarest 
1. Introduction 
Recent spikes in international food prices have caused widespread concern. After a long period of 
decline starting in the mid-1970s, agricultural prices began increasing in the year 2000 (see Figure 
1). Prices rose sharply in 2007 and peaked halfway through 2008. Due to the financial and 
economic crisis, food prices decreased briefly, yet they rose again steeply from 2010. Since then, 
they have remained on a high level. This is expected to last in the future because of factors such 
as climate change, increasing demand, and slowing production (see e.g. OECD/FAO, 2013). 
 
Figure 1. Long-term evolution of food prices (1960-2011), 2005 = 100, real 2005$ 
 
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities, 2013. 
 
The period 2007-2008 raised attention to the risks posed by soaring food prices. Putting a limit to 
the rise of food prices and mitigating its impact on food security and malnutrition acquired a 
prominent place on the global policy agenda. The FAO, for example, launched its “Initiative on 
Soaring Food Prices” in December 2007, the UN convened the High Level Task Force on the 
Global Food Security Crisis in April 2008, and the European Union established a food facility 
budget line in December 2008. The causes and economic consequences of the international food 
price rise have been widely studied and debated, including controversial issues such as the extent 
to which biofuel production and speculation in international financial markets contributed to rising 
prices (see e.g. FAO 2008a, 2011; World Food Programme, 2009). Yet, the increase in food prices 
in 2007-2008 also drew attention to the potential for mass protests and violent riots. 
‘Food riots’ received considerable media attention at the time and the causal link between rising 
food prices and violent conflict or political instability was often regarded as self-evident by 
journalists as well as policymakers (see e.g. Hoyos & Blas, 2008; Lacey, 2008). Illustratively, 
Jacques Diouf, the Director-General of the FAO from 1994 until 2011, stated for example that 
“Naturally people won't be sitting dying of starvation, they will react." (in: Pomeroy, 2008) and 
referred directly to the possibility of civil war as a consequence of the food price rise (The 
Economic Times, 2008). A World Food Program food security analyst cited in the New York Times 
made similar remarks: “The human instinct is to survive, and people are going to do no matter what 
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to survive. And if you’re hungry you get angry quicker.” (in: Lacey, 2008). Later events during the 
Arab Spring were linked to food price rises as well (see e.g. The Economist, 2012). These 
comments fit into a popular neo-Malthusian line of thinking in which it is assumed that factors such 
as resource scarcity and overpopulation will lead to widespread chaos and violence (see for 
example Ehrlich 1968; Kaplan 1994). Yet although this perspective has a certain intuitive appeal - 
we assume the deprived will not stand idly by in misery without resorting to (violent) action- the 
issue appears to be far more complex when individual cases are being analyzed. 
The 2007-2008 food price spike has also inspired many researchers to investigate the causal 
relationship between international food price rises and the occurrence of various forms of conflict 
and political instability. While this literature has contributed to our understanding of this 
relationship, there are a number of flaws and misunderstandings shared with the more popular 
neo-Malthusian comments above. The objective of this paper is to discuss these further and offer 
ways of addressing them. I will focus on three main issues: the vague use of concepts, uncritical 
data gathering, and presupposed and understudied causal mechanisms. 
All too often researchers use notions of ‘conflict’, ‘instability’, or ‘unrest’ interchangeably without 
clear specifications. The concept of  ‘food riot’ is particularly troublesome and I argue that while this 
term might have a certain attention-raising purpose for the media, its use is disputable in scientific 
debate. Connected to this latter issue is the fact that many researchers rely too much on vague 
news reports to identify food riots without critically assessing the actual events that took place and 
whether the food issue is really the cause for conflict. I demonstrate these issues in particular for 
the events that took place in Africa during the period 2007-2008. Finally, with regards to causal 
mechanisms involved, the relationship between international food price rises and conflict is too 
easily assumed to be a relationship between food insecurity and conflict. Moreover, although 
several authors have already indicated important intervening variables, our overall understanding 
of the causal mechanisms at work remains limited. I draw lessons from closely related literatures, 
in particular from the literature focusing on resource scarcity and conflict, and the ‘third wave’ of 
democratization, to show that when economic factors are chosen as the starting point of analyses, 
one has to advance other contextual factors to explain conflict (non-) occurrence. Yet while 
economic factors are often acknowledged as ‘triggers’ in the literature, research efforts on 
identifying relevant intervening variables have not advanced much further, leaving us with only 
vague conceptualizations of ‘context’. Hence, more research is needed on defining which ‘contexts’ 
or which ‘intervening’ variables are likely to lead to different forms of conflict. 
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I review the current state of the art on food price 
rises and political instability. In section 3, I show how the indiscriminate use of ‘(violent) conflict’ 
and ‘political instability’ leads to conceptual and empirical confusion. I specifically address the ‘food 
riot’ concept. Section 4 revisits the 2007-2008 ‘food riots’ in Africa and indicates several crucial 
problems with research on these events based on actual case descriptions. Section 5 focuses on 
the causal mechanism between international food price increases and conflict. Section 6 concludes 
and indicates different avenues for future research. 
2. Food Prices and Violent Conflict: Conceptual and Empirical State of the Art 
Neo-Malthusian works predicting a future of conflict and chaos due to natural resource depletion, 
population growth, and urbanization such as Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy (1994), Ehrlich’s The 
Population Bomb (1968), or Davis’ Planet of Slums (2006), have always engendered widespread 
attention from the general public and policymakers, but also from academics, who try to test these 
claims scientifically. It was therefore not very surprising that the food protests taking place in the 
period 2007-2008 simultaneously led to comments by journalists and political players defending 
the natural link between hunger and violence, and to a new surge of academic studies concerning 
the linkages between food insecurity and violent conflict or political instability. Several researchers 
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have in their work reflected on the history of food and conflict and have traced this back to early 
eighteenth century European food riots (see e.g. Bellemare, 2011; Patel & McMichael, 2009)1. It is 
worthwhile discussing this literature before turning to more recent studies. 
Early Western European food riots were often -and similar to the current period- seen as direct 
consequences of hunger, but this line of thinking has already been questioned by several 
prominent social scientists. In his work on eighteenth century food riots in England for example, 
Thompson (1971) refuted the, as he called it, ‘spasmodic’ approach often brought forward by 
historians and journalists working on these events. According to him, the food riots by the English 
crowd in the eighteenth century were not simply instinctive reactions to hunger or a result of 
‘degeneration’, but were legitimized by the belief of the participants “that they were defending 
traditional rights and customs; and, in general, that they were supported by the wider consensus of 
the community” (p. 78). Protesters were defending their view on how the (food) economy should 
function: a community in which poor consumers were protected from food shortages or high prices. 
This is what Thompson famously termed ‘the moral economy’. Riots in eighteenth century Europe 
should be understood as a reaction to the effects of the slow transition from a paternalist food 
economy with price controls to a laissez-faire market system. 
L. Tilly (1971), and C. Tilly (1976) also argued against rioting as an instinctive reaction to hunger in 
the case of early European food riots: the worst famines were over by that time and per capita food 
supply was probably increasing. Instead, they frame these in the context of state centralization, the 
decline of traditional paternalistic economic policy (Thompson’s moral economy), and the formation 
of a national market. For the French Revolution – sometimes seen as a large-scale ‘food riot’-  
Rudé (1959) has similarly stated that the essential motive for participation of the masses in the 
French Revolution was the need for cheap bread, although he opposes views that see the 
‘masses’ as simple followers of revolutionary leaders out of hunger, or because of bribery and loot-
seeking. 
Walton and Seddon’s (1994) Free Markets and Food Riots is also commonly cited in current 
studies. The authors investigate why, starting in the mid-1970s, demonstrations, strikes and violent 
riots occurred in some developing countries but not others as a result of the imposition of structural 
adjustment programs by the international financial institutions (and their implementation by local 
elites). They find that IMF pressure and overurbanization form the best predictors of austerity riots. 
These factors are seen as indicators of economic distress: higher IMF pressure proxies for severe 
reform demands, while overurbanization is seen as an indicator of a large mass of unemployed 
urban poor ready to take part in riots. The authors do not just provide an economic account of the 
austerity protests in the developing world, but introduce two nuances. For the first they make use 
of the moral economy argument. Just as the replacement of paternalist economic policy to a 
laissez-faire regime in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe led to the emergence of food 
riots, so did the introduction of neoliberal policies with the SAPs (‘Free Markets’) lead to austerity 
protests in Third World countries. The prior, pre-SAP moral economy in this case was one of 
‘urban bias’. A second nuance to the economic account of austerity protests focuses on collective 
action and the ways through which this is facilitated. Using evidence from case studies, Walton & 
Seddon (1994) argue that austerity protests required a strong organizational capacity to mobilize. 
Therefore, countries, and more precisely cities, with a strong civil society (unions, political groups, 
community associations, churches etc.) seemed more prone to protests. 
Since 2008, several quantitative studies have strengthened the link between international food 
price rises and various measures of ‘unrest’. Lagi et al. (2011), for example, have calculated an 
international food price threshold that when crossed is likely to lead to political instability in the 
world. They base their analyses on violent events during the 2007-2008 food price rise and the 
subsequent price rise in 2010 to which the Arab Spring is linked. The authors rely on media reports 
                                                     
1
 Or even the provision of ‘bread and circuses’ in ancient Rome (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2010, pp. 3-4). 
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for data collection. However, the study gathers events throughout the world and no economic, 
political or social intervening variables2 are used. 
Other authors have tried to incorporate intervening variables. For a panel of over 120 countries 
during the period 1970-2007, Arezki & Brückner (2011) find a significant effect of rising 
international food prices on the decline of a country’s democracy score, the occurrence of civil war, 
and the number of anti-government demonstrations and riots only for a panel of Low-Income 
countries. Their study thus indicates a first important intervening variable: national level of income. 
Carter & Bates (2012) build further on this study and argue that when controlled for government 
policies tempering price rises, there is no relationship between food price shocks and civil war. 
Hendrix, Haggard & Magaloni (2009) analyze the relationship between fluctuations in international 
food prices and urban social disorder in Africa and Asia for the period 1960-2006. They find that 
the relation between international food price fluctuations and unrest is contingent on regime type, 
as hybrid regimes combining authoritarian and democratic characteristics are found to experience 
significantly more protests. It is argued that these regimes lack the capacity of authoritarian states 
to repress protests and the participatory institutions of democracies to hold leaders accountable in 
other ways. 
Finally, a study of Berazneva & Lee (2013) specifically focuses on Africa during the period 2007-
2008 and find that the country score on the Human Poverty Index, the presence of a large urban 
agglomeration, and the amount of foreign aid per capita  positively correlate with protest 
occurrence. The national score on the Freedom House Political Rights Index, the Food Production 
Index per capita, and the country location in Sub-Sahara Africa (relatively more protests took place 
in North Africa) have a negative correlation. Different theoretical explanations are combined in 
these results: a low Human Poverty Index score indicates increased vulnerability to rising food 
prices; a large urban agglomeration is connected to the urban collective action account (see 
above); Freedom House Score reflects regime type3; and the Food Production Index per capita is 
intended to indicate reliance on food imports. 
Some of the qualitative accounts of the 2007-2008 protests emphasize more local-level intervening 
characteristics and causal mechanisms. For example, Harsch (2008) focuses on protests in African 
countries and links these to problems of governance. According to the author, protests are not just 
expressions of dissatisfaction with higher costs of living, but also reflect underlying discontent with 
authoritarian and corrupt politics. He also notes that where governments took up dialogue with civil 
society actors, protests stayed out or were more peaceful. Bush (2010), and Patel and McMichael 
(2009) trace the 2007-2008 food protests to the current neoliberal food regime. While the 
international food system increases developing countries vulnerability to the consequences of 
international food price fluctuations, both studies also interlink the political consequences to local-
level societal characteristics, such as regime type and pre-existing modes of social organization 
(confer Walton & Seddon, 1994). 
This state of the art comprises the currently most cited studies on the relationship between 
international food price rises and conflict. Many researchers have already made substantial efforts 
at identifying relevant intervening variables, based on the earlier literature on food and conflict, and 
conflict research more general. In the following sections, however, I critically review this emerging 
literature on three levels: the use of concepts, the gathering of data, and the specification of causal 
mechanisms. 
                                                     
2
 An intervening variable is understood here as a moderating variable (versus a mediating variable). 
3
 Note that most regimes called ‘authoritarian’ are often hybrid regimes according to the classification of 
Polity IV scores. 
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3. Violent Conflict and Political Instability: Conceptual Clarifications 
Many popular commentators easily make the jump between ‘riots’, ‘political violence’, ‘crime’, ‘coup 
d’états’, or ‘civil war’.  Academics can, however, cause similar conceptual confusion. In the current 
literature on food prices and conflict, the dependent variable under investigation has been: social 
unrest, (socio)political instability, (food) protests and riots, civil war, and authoritarian regime 
change. It is, however, important to clarify these often vague categories and differentiate them from 
one another. 
A first remark here concerns the conceptualization of conflict, which can manifest itself peacefully 
or violently. In this regard, peaceful demonstrations can be understood as a valid tactic of a group 
to signal a conflict and strengthen its position. This does not have to be a cause for concern. Even 
if we only consider violent conflict, however, a distinction between different types is important as 
the ‘contexts’ or the structural conditions, and the causal mechanisms leading to each can also 
differ substantially - essentially a problem of unit heterogeneity. This has clearly been argued by 
Collier & Hoeffler (2002) and Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner (2009) who emphasize that grievances 
alone cannot explain civil war as a distinct category of conflict. Resources are needed to build an 
insurgency force: financial possibilities, weapons, recruits, a safe refuge haven from government 
troops…in short: a power base. 
Political instability is perhaps an even trickier concept than that of violent conflict. Most intuitively, it 
reflects an uncertainty about the continuing existence of a political system. It is often associated 
with regime transitions. In the Polity IV4 dataset we can equate political instability with the -66 
(‘interruption periods’ between foreign occupation and a new independent polity), -77 (‘interregnum 
periods’ during which there is a complete collapse of central political authority, mostly because of 
civil war), and -88 scores (‘transition periods’ during which new institutions are planned, legally 
constituted, and put into effect) (Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2013). Yet it is very difficult to establish 
whether a new regime has been consolidated. In the case of democratic transition, for example, 
few observers would adhere to Huntington’s (1991) two-turnover test in practice. 
Violent conflict and political instability cannot be equated easily. The form of conflict relates to how 
we evaluate political stability. With reference to a particular territory of the state, it seems logical 
that where violent (ethnic) clashes occur or armed rebels operate, there is local political instability. 
Yet, usually political instability is interpreted at the country-level, in terms of the central state (e.g. 
‘the failed state’). Remote rural conflicts do not necessarily lead to the evaluation that a state is 
politically unstable, not even civil war if it is contained to a certain region and the conflict is not very 
active (see also The Polity IV manual, Marshall, Gurr & Jaggers, 2013). The Casamance in 
Senegal, for example, still hosts a rebellion of the local population, but the conflict simmers and 
does not lead to an instable evaluation of the country itself5. When rebels are relatively successful 
and able to threaten the central government, there is clear political instability, however. 
Low-level, small-scale violence such as violent riots can be argued lo lead to political instability as 
well. The assumption that many commentators seem to hold is that riots will escalate, grow in 
numbers and consequently challenge the regime. Yet the jump from one riot to escalation and 
instability is a big one, and a single riot can just as well be a one-time contained event without 
further political repercussions. Escalation and instability can also happen with peaceful protests, for 
example when they are sustained in a ‘protest cycle’ (see e.g. Tarrow, 2002), but again, one 
protest does not make the ‘cycle’. There is therefore a danger in equating one protest event with 
(the possibility of) political instability as there is no necessary and automatic connection between 
them. 
                                                     
4
 The Polity IV Project codes the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of 
comparative, quantitative analysis (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
5
 In this regard, it is useful to remark that the Correlates of War definition of civil war (1000 battle-related 
deaths per year) does not hold; yet, there is smaller-scale armed conflict. 
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The last important remark here concerns the concept of ‘food riot’. Firstly, by reviewing the 
literature, it becomes clear that the perhaps popular idea of people turning to indiscriminate 
violence and looting out of hunger rarely seems to hold. Thompson (1971) and Tilly’s (1971) food 
riots, for example, were comprised of attacks on known millers and middlemen suspected of unjust 
behaviour6, while goods were sold at a ‘fair market price’ by the community instead of being simply 
stolen. 
Secondly, ‘food riots’ have a very different meaning for Walton & Seddon (1994). Although they 
provide an overview of earlier European food riots, it is not entirely clear whether Walton and 
Seddon are talking about the same thing. In their work, ‘food riots’ are used as an encompassing 
term for demonstrations, strikes and violent riots occurring in developing countries due to the 
implementation of structural adjustment programs. These austerity protests are also sometimes 
referred to as ‘IMF riots’ (Auvinen 1996).  
In a way, Walton & Seddon (1994) use ‘food riots’ more as an attractive term than as a scientific 
concept. The new economic policies of the SAPs included cutting wages, price subsidies, and 
public service delivery. The removal of food subsidies occurred quite often, which is why the term 
‘food riot’ was chosen. The food issue is not always exactly what caused the contentious action, 
however. And even if it did, the form of protest does not relate anymore to seventeenth and 
eighteenth century European food riots. One could say that the ‘repertoire’ (Tilly, 1993, p. 264) of 
the food riot has changed, and is now seen in the form of commonly known anti-government 
actions. Importantly, for Walton & Seddon, this can also include peaceful actions. 
As I will argue in the next section, the ‘food riots’ of the period 2007-2008 correspond more to 
Walton & Seddon’s (1994) conception of the term than to those of Thompson (1971) or Tilly 
(1971). This is characterized by a lot of vagueness about the possible form of contentious action 
(demonstration, riot, strike…) and the issue at hand (food, wages, tax increases…), which renders 
its usefulness as a scientific concept doubtful. Therefore, we should be careful with (sensational) 
statements such as ‘the food riot has returned’. 
4. Revisiting the 2007-2008 ‘Food Riots’ 
2007-2008 is commonly known as the period when widespread food riots shook the world. As I will 
argue in this section, however, the extent to which protests fit into the ‘food riot’ frame is unclear for 
a number of reasons: reliable data collection on ‘food protests’ is difficult to establish; violent and 
peaceful protests are often lumped together; even in violent cases government repression often 
has more to do with the violence element than the desperation of the poor; and the degree to 
which food is actually the main issue behind popular mobilization can seem remarkably dubious in 
some cases. 
Many researchers acknowledge that the period 2007-2008 saw a mixture of violent and peaceful 
food protests. Yet, they often add the two forms together in following paragraphs as ‘food riots’ 
(perhaps for a more spectacular count of events) or continue with a theoretical discussion on the 
possible links between food insecurity and violent conflict or instability (see e.g. Berazneva & Lee, 
2013; Brinkman & Hendrix, 2010; Patel & McMichael, 2009; Simmons, 2013). Admittedly, 
references to the 2007-2008 food protests often only serve as an introduction to the broader topic 
of how international food price rises or food insecurity can have serious political consequences. 
However, since these are the actual cases used to demonstrate those arguments, it might serve us 
well to investigate them more closely. 
                                                     
6
 Riots are indeed rarely indiscriminate, whether directed at ethnic groups or the government (Wilkinson, 
2009). 
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I have compiled a table on the occurrence of food protests in Africa according to different sources 
(see Table 1). I limit my analysis to Africa for two reasons: firstly, many protests took place in 
African countries - as low-income food-deficit countries (FAO, 2008) they were also among the 
most vulnerable to the food crisis; secondly, although ‘pasta protests’ in Italy are often included in 
accounts of food riots (see e.g. Patel & McMichael, 2009), they are rarely considered to be a cause 
for concern. Most people already assume the importance of intervening characteristics, e.g. initial 
levels of poverty (see also von Braun, 2008). 
For most sources information is based on news reports, although Carter and Bates (2012) and 
Harsch (2008) do not specify how information was collected. However, it appears that only the 
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD)7 uses a systematic data collection method. Benson et al. 
(2008) distinguish explicitly between violent and non-violent protests, but without elaborating on 
their criteria. Some African countries are not included in their list. Berazneva & Lee (2013), Harsch 
(2008), Schneider (2008), and von Braun (2008) combine violent and non-violent actions in their 
reviews of ‘food riots’. ‘Food riot events’ are marked with an X, except for Schneider who 
specifically refers to several news reports, with dates, so these have been included in the table. 
Carter and Bates (2012) only refer to ‘food riots’ (also marked with X), but do not explain their 
inclusion criteria further. Finally, SCAD was browsed for events between 01/01/2007 and 
12/31/2008 that could be linked to rising food prices. For each event the start date is given, as well 
as the event type according to SCAD, although I sometimes only generally refer to numerous 
events. A broad perspective was used, meaning that events that from the description were not 
specifically linked to high food prices, but could theoretically be linked, have been added and 
marked with an asterisk. This mostly concerns wage disputes. 
A couple of peculiarities arise from Table 1. First of all, data sources often combine peaceful and 
violent events, while the two can have very different dynamics. Secondly, there is not always a 
good match between the data sources. Some countries stand out specifically: Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, South-Africa, Tunisia, and 
Zimbabwe. A comparison of different sources shows that our knowledge of the wave of food riots 
in 2007-2008 seems quite limited after all. Information on Kenya, for example, ranges from 
completely silent to violent protests, and while information on Zimbabwe is very unclear (see also 
Schneider, 2008, p. 26), it is also considered to be a ‘riot country’ by Berazneva & Lee (2013). A 
closer look at actual protest accounts raises some further problems. 
It has already been noted that violent and peaceful events are often brought under the same 
header of ‘food riot’. Yet, even when violent protests occurred, it remains the question what 
actually constituted the violence element of the event. Schneider (2008) provides a summary 
report of food riots based on news reports. For several cases information on riots is so vague that 
a clear event description cannot be distinguished (Mozambique, Somalia, Zimbabwe). In some 
cases, protesters are reported to have immediately turned to violent means (Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon), while in other cases it seems clear that violence in the conflict was mainly caused by 
(sometimes lethal) police repression (Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Senegal, Tunisia). Repression can 
therefore be seen as a more important cause for escalation, conflict and instability than food prices 
themselves. The violent aspect of many ‘violent protests’ often says more about the reaction of the 
state than the desperation of the poor and contradicts the more popular image of the ‘food riot’. 
Senegal, for example, is commonly known as a stable and democratic country. The ‘food riot’ 
frame could lead to the impression that even in stable democracies, violence and instability loom 
when food prices rise. Yet, commentators working on Senegal specifically have also remarked 
then-President Wade’s increasing authoritarian and repressive tendencies (see e.g. Dahou & 
                                                     
7
 The Social Conflict in Africa Database compiles protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government 
violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict from 1990 to 2011 for all countries in Africa with a 
population of over one million (https://www.strausscenter.org/scad.html). 
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Table 1: Comparison of the 2007-2008 African (violent) protest accounts 
 Benson et 
al. (2008)
i
 
Berazneva 
& Lee 
(2013)
ii
 
Carter & 
Bates 
(2012)
iii
 
Harsch 
(2008)
iv
 
Schneider 
(2008)
v
 
Social Conflict in Africa Database (Hendrix & Salehyan, 
2012)
vi
 
Von 
Braun
vii
 
(2008) 
Algeria /     /  
Angola /     /  
Benin /     /  
Burkina Faso Violent & 
non-violent 
protest 
X X X Febr 20, 21 
2008 
02/21/2008: spontaneous demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (food prices). 
03/15/2008: Organized demonstration (cost of living)* 
04/08/2008 & 05/13/2008: General strike (cost of living)* 
X 
Burundi /     10/23/2007: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
12/03/2007: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
09/22/2008: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
 
Cameroon Violent 
Protest 
X X X Febr 25-28 
2008 
07/09/2007: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
11/28/2007: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
02/25/2008: Limited strike escalated to spontaneous riot (food 
prices) 
X 
Central African 
Republic 
Not included     10/25/2008 & 01/02/2008 Limited strike (wage increases)* 
 
 
Chad Not included     /  
Congo, 
Republic of 
/     /  
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Not included     Numerous wage disputes*  
Côte d’Ivoire Violent 
Protest 
X X X March 31 
2008 
03/26/2007: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
03/31/2008: spontaneous demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (food prices). 
07/14/2008: Limited strike (increase in gas prices)* 
X 
Egypt Violent 
Protest 
X X X April 6 2008 01/18/2007: Organized demonstration (food prices) 
01/17/2008: Organized demonstration (food prices) 
12/15/2008: Organized demonstration (trial on participation in 
food riots in April 2008, but this event could not be found) 
X 
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Eritrea Not included     /  
Ethiopia Non-violent 
protest 
X X   / X 
Gabon Not included   X  04/22/2008: Spontaneous demonstration (food prices) 
10/01/2008: Limited strike (wage increases)* 
 
The Gambia /     /  
Ghana /     /  
Guinea Violent 
protest 
X  X (Jan/Febr 
2007) 
May & June 
2008 
 
05/03/2007: Spontaneous riot (wage increases, soldiers)* 
09/18/2007: Spontaneous riot (cost of living)* 
06/16/2008: Limited strike escalated to organized riot (wage 
increases, police)* 
09/08/2008: Limited strike (electricity prices)* 
11/03/2008: Spontaneous riot (fuel prices)* 
X 
Guinea-Bissau /     /  
Kenya Violent & 
non-violent 
protest 
    05/31/2008: Organized demonstration (food prices) X 
Liberia /     /  
Libya Not included     /  
Madagascar Non-violent 
protest 
X   April 2008 / X 
Malawi /     /  
Mali /     06/26/2007: General strike (wage increases)?  
Mauritania Violent 
Protest 
X  X (Nov 2007) 11/07/2007: Spontaneous riot (food prices) – 3 cities 
11/13/2007: Spontaneous demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (food prices) 
X 
Morocco Violent & 
non-violent 
protest 
X  X (March & 
Sept 2007) 
Febr 2008 
09/23/2007: Spontaneous demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (food prices) 
X 
Mozambique Violent 
Protest 
X X X Febr 5 
2008 
02/05/2008: Organized demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (bus fares)* 
 
Namibia /     /  
Niger Non-violent 
protest 
    06/27/2008: Spontaneous demonstration (food prices) X 
Nigeria /     Numerous strikes (wages and fuel prices)*  
Rwanda /     /  
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Senegal Violent & 
non-violent 
protest 
X X X March & 
April 2008 
03/30/2008: Spontaneous demonstration (high prices) 
05/22/2008: General strike (food prices) 
X 
Sierra Leone /     /  
Somalia Violent & 
non-violent 
protest 
X X  May 5 2008 05/05/2008: Spontaneous demonstration escalated to 
spontaneous riot (food prices) 
X 
 
South-Africa Nonviolent 
protest 
    05/25/2007: Organized demonstration (wage increases)* 
06/01/2007: Limited strike escalated to organized 
demonstration (wage increases)* 
07/09/2008: Organized demonstration (food prices) 
08/06/2008: General strike (food prices) 
X 
Sudan /     /  
Tanzania Not included     /  
Togo /     /  
Tunisia Violent 
Protest 
X  X June 13 
2008 
(Redeyef) 
06/06/2007: Spontaneous riot (poor living conditions)* 
(Redeyef) 
X 
Uganda /     02/06/2008: Limited strike (wage increases)*  
Zambia /     unclear  
Zimbabwe / X   unclear 04/03/2007: General Strike (economic conditions) 
Numerous strikes (wage increases) 
10/16/2008: Organized demonstration (food crisis)* 
 
                                                     
i
 Benson et al. use a 2006- august 2008 time reference. 
ii
 Berazneva & Lee (2013) partly use data from Harsch (2008). 
iii
 Unclear whether limited to the year 2008 or the period 2007-2008. 
iv
 Harsch (2008) does not claim to provide an exhaustive account. There is no clear start date for the count of protests. The article was published in July 2008. 
v
 Schneider (2008) limits her search to the year 2008, with September as the last month. Not intended to be comprehensive. 
vi
 Compiles events reported by the Associated Press (AP) and Agence France Presse (AFP). Browsed for events from 01/01/2007 to 12/31/2008. Events that did not 
seem connected to the food price rise (in any way) are left out. 
vii
 Presentation published in September, 2008. 
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I look at three cases in more detail: Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger. While Burkina Faso appears 
to fit the food riot frame relatively well, this can also be contested. The story that appears from an 
IRIN (2008) news report is that protesters immediately turn to violent actions - even stoning a 
government delegation sent to make peace – while policymakers are desperately trying to lower 
prices by releasing stocks and cutting taxes. Yet, the riots also erupted in three particular cities of 
Burkina Faso - Bobo Dioulasso, Ouahigouya and Banfora – which have a tradition of opposition to 
the government (Maccatory et al. 2010). Moreover, the actual trigger to the protests could also 
have been – yet in the context of higher food prices- a government rise in taxation rates on basic 
products (Ibid.). 
In the case of Guinea events seem to be ‘stretched’ into a food riot frame. Take the following 
example: “in May and June 2008 clashes between military factions, and between the military and 
police lead to hundreds of injuries and several deaths. Both groups counted among their 
demands a call for higher rice subsidies” (IRIN, 2008b in Schneider, 2008, emphasis by 
Schneider). Surely more is going on in the case of Guinea than a ‘food riot’. The country’s brutal 
history can be traced in the Polity IV (2013) country reports, with the military playing a particularly 
prominent role. The frame of food riot - although often unintentional – seems to place too much 
emphasis on the possible (and sensational) violent consequences of rising food prices, yet 
obscures local political factors that are more relevant causes for the actual outcome. In Table 1, we 
can see that for Guinea, SCAD makes no clear reference to food prices (and picks up many 
different events). Differences between SCAD and the other data sources are often dependent on 
my personal choice to include other events such as strikes over wages. Yet, this serves my point 
here well: on the basis of what criteria do we actually term something a ‘food riot’? If the reporter 
had referred to the higher costs of living in the country, would all these cases have been similarly 
called ‘food riots’? 
A final problem concerns the case of Niger. According to some sources no protests took place in 
Niger, while others recount a peaceful protest (see Table 1). In the studies of Harsch (2008) and 
Berazneva & Lee (2013) the assumption that no events took place, leads the authors to see Niger 
as an example of negotiations to avoid food unrest. But the fact that no events (or only peaceful 
ones) took place in Niger can be a matter of agency. If one would look at the case of Niger from a 
more dynamic, long-term perspective instead of a short-term event-focused one, it would become 
clear that Niger is not an example in the field of food security and political stability, also beyond the 
period 2007-2008 (see e.g. Maccatory et al. 2010; Mueller, 2011). When studying single protest 
events in a cross-sectional fashion, caution is warranted in making conclusions from negative 
cases. 
In this section I have attempted to raise some critical reflections regarding our empirical knowledge 
and understanding of the 2007-2008 ‘food riots’. Many peaceful protests have been termed ‘riots’ 
by journalists, but researchers as well. Yet while the use of violence usually says something more 
about the regime (e.g. repression) rather than the protesters, peaceful protesting can be 
considered normal democratic practice. In this perspective, it is not very surprising, or concerning, 
that people protest to raise attention to higher costs of living. What are the implications of the 
occurrence versus the non-occurrence of a peaceful food price protest? Perhaps protesting is part 
of  the way democratic politics are conducted in a certain society, in contrast to societies where 
inclusivity, and immediate negotiations with civil society or corporatism are prevalent – indeed, the 
non-occurrence of protests can also indicate a hard repressive regime.  
Secondly, researchers too often rely on what media consider to be food-related protests. (Western) 
media have their own ‘framing’ and ‘gatekeeping’ goals, which can obscure the actual causes of 
conflict, and researchers should critically engage with journalistic reports when using these as the 
basis of (quantitative) analyses. Divergent news sources also leads to divergent accounts of 
positive and negative cases (see Table 1), which can greatly influence statistical findings. 
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A possible remark now could be that the political impact of higher food prices will become more 
serious in the future – and perhaps the Arab Spring would already be included in that argument – 
as food prices will remain high. This is why I analyze more closely the causal links between rising 
international food prices and conflict/instability in the following section. 
5. Food Price Rises and Conflict: Addressing the Causal Mechanisms 
This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first challenges the establishment of food 
insecurity as a cause of conflict when international food prices increase. The second part takes a 
closer look at a topic in the literature which is narrowly related to food price rises and conflict, 
namely resource scarcity and conflict, and draws lessons from this with particular relevance to 
current debates. The third part does the same with regards to the topic of regime change in Africa 
during the 1990s. 
5.1. From the Global to the Local: the Transmission of International Food Prices  
The international food price rise of 2007-2008 and the occurrence of food protests has led many 
scholars (see e.g. Brinkman & Hendrix, 2008; Simmons, 2013) to investigate the link between food 
insecurity and conflict. This suggests an implicit assumption that the causal chain between 
increasing international food prices and conflict runs through food insecurity. The image of a rise of 
the hungry poor is strongly embedded here. This relationship is presupposed, however. When 
considering the impact of international food price rises, it is important to acknowledge that a myriad 
of factors can influence the local-level economic impact of increasing international food prices (see 
e.g. Benson et al., 2008; FAO, 2011), including, for example, the degree of food import 
dependence of a country (or region), the exchange rate, pre-existing levels of poverty, government 
trade and social policies, consumer vs. producer status of a household and so on8. As low-income 
food-importers, African countries were clearly specifically vulnerable to an international food price 
rise. Yet this relationship, based on country-level variables, does not necessarily mean that the 
worst affected, or the most food insecure, initiate or participate in conflict. This remains an 
empirical question to be investigated.  
The issue is reminiscent of the well-established low GDP per capita and civil war onset link, which 
has been interpreted as an individual-level motivation to participate in rebellion (‘greed’) or as a low 
state capacity to deter insurgencies (see e.g. Hegre & Holtermann, 2012). Theoretically, an 
international food price increase can lead to conflict through other channels than food insecurity, 
for example if the state cuts import taxes, loses income and is therefore more easily challenged by 
rebel contestants. Another debate on poverty and conflict, in particular whether people participate 
in violent action for private material gain (greed) or a collective sense of injustice (grievance, see 
e.g. Gurr, 2002), can also be advanced in food prices and conflict discussions (see e.g. Barrett, 
2013).  
A focus on national aggregates often does not provide the means to distinguish between different 
possible mechanisms. This is also why large-N studies of civil war are increasingly being 
disaggregated, making use of more local-level characteristics (see e.g. Buhaug et al., 2011). Of 
course, due to constraints in data availability, disaggregating comparative analyses on international 
food price rises and their political consequences remains challenging. However, several initiatives 
                                                     
8
 Several authors have, of course, incorporated factors such as country-specific food price indexes (Arezki & 
Brückner, 2011), government rates of assistance (Carter & Bates, 2012), and a food production index 
(Berazneva & Lee, 2013). Yet these are still national (yearly) aggregates, and in the latter case, the use of 
FAOSTAT’s National Food Production Index is actually a peculiar choice to compare food import 
dependency between countries as the index compares the production level of a country to its production 
level in the base year. 
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on monitoring trends in local food prices9 are available (see e.g. FAO GIEWS Food Price Data and 
Analysis Tool, RESIMAO). In addition, national statistical agencies, even in developing countries, 
are increasingly publishing economic indicators on the sub-national-level. Using more local-level 
factors also helps in investigating the relationship between food insecurity and conflict in more 
detail, as food insecurity can be caused by international food price rises and domestic shocks. 
5.2. Lessons from the Resource Scarcity and Conflict Literature 
There are important parallels between the current food price/food insecurity-conflict literature and 
the literature on resource scarcity and conflict. The main proponents of the latter, Homer-Dixon 
(1999) and Kahl (2006), have argued that scarcities caused by factors such as climate change, 
land degradation, and population growth can lead to violent conflicts, especially in the poorest 
countries. Again, the types of conflict mentioned are far-ranging: from sporadic, localized violence 
to large-scale, sustained and organized forms of political violence. Importantly, while environmental 
scarcity can be an independent cause of conflict, it is never seen as a sole or sufficient cause. 
Context matters and environmental scarcity only produces its effects when joined with other 
economic, political, and social factors. For example, Homer-Dixon’s ‘structural scarcity’ is 
determined by underlying inequality, and conflict can arise when predatory elites ‘capture’ the 
remaining resources- a causal process we can intuitively link to an undemocratic regime. Kahl 
investigated why conflict arose at certain times but not at others in Kenya and the Philippines, and 
stresses two crucial intervening variables, namely ‘groupness’, a concept relating to the unity of a 
group and the possibility for collective action, and institutional inclusivity, or whether grievances 
can be redressed by peaceful means through government responsiveness. 
Although several large-N quantitative analyses have placed doubts on the scarcity-conflict link (see 
for an overview Theisen et al., 2012), the intricate causal processes brought forward by Homer-
Dixon and Kahl have still not been sufficiently tested. As Theisen et al. (2012) state: most studies 
fail to account adequately for proposed indirect and conditional effects. They only use simple 
interaction terms, but relationships may be characterized by threshold effects and can apply only 
under certain conditions. This problem is inherent to the perspective taken in the resource scarcity-
conflict literature, however. With resource scarcity (itself already encompassing many different 
phenomena) as the starting point of the analysis, the links that can (theoretically) be made to 
diverging forms of conflict, in divergent contexts, lead to a serious ‘too many variables’ problem. 
And this while the actual importance of the causal role of scarcity itself can be doubted. 
Proponents of resource scarcity-conflict dynamics stress contextual factors as well as the 
independent causal role of scarcity. When it comes to actual cases, it is important to keep in mind, 
however, that selection is often – but not always (see e.g. Kahl, 2006) – made on the dependent 
variable (Gleditsch, 1998). A lot of possible negative cases exist where scarcity does not lead to 
conflict. For example, the Great Bengal Famine, so famously described by Sen (1991), did not lead 
to political unrest, while popular thinking could easily expect widespread violence and looting, 
especially if, as Sen claims, the famine was not caused by a shortage in food supplies.  
Even in positive cases, it is not always clear whether scarcity or context should receive most 
attention. For example, Benjaminsen (2008) questions the necessity of the 1970s and 1980s 
drought for the Tuareg rebellion in Northern Mali at the time. He argues that it probably would have 
happened anyway due to already present conflict causes. A plausible root cause is the strong 
cultural, economic10, and socio-political divide between the North and the South, or geographically 
                                                     
9
 Although for some regions local food prices may not be that relevant because of dependence on 
subsistence agriculture. 
10
 The economic aspect – especially in this case – can also be linked to chronic food insecurity: a structural 
condition more than a trigger. Yet this is not the only aspect: there is also the political and cultural divide, and 
therefore the complete marginalization of a ‘group’. 
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overlapping horizontal inequalities (Stewart, 2002). This does not have to refute Homer-Dixon’s 
viewpoints as social channels condition the link between scarcity and conflict, but social 
characteristics can also lead to conflict in other ways. It does, however, show that it is not because 
we see scarcity in a certain case, that it has an important role in the violent conflict that takes 
place11. 
Similar to resource scarcity-conflict debates, food prices (or food insecurity) are linked to divergent 
forms of conflict in which positive cases get most attention. The role of scarcity in some positive 
cases is not critically analyzed and negative cases are to a large extent neglected. To account for 
the occurrence versus the non-occurrence of conflict, many scarcity proponents necessarily have 
to rely on ‘context’. There is, however, a lack of engagement with this ‘context’ versus the 
economic shock factor. 
5.3. Economic shocks, urban protests, and regime transitions 
Resource scarcity is commonly linked to conflicts in remote rural areas. Recent food protests, 
however, have often taken place in urban areas12, and have been linked by observers to the risk of 
political instability and regime change (see e.g. Arezki & Brückner, 2011). Adverse economic 
conditions and urban protests have often been connected to regime transitions in the developing 
world. Bates (1984) and Lipton (1976), for example, already made the connection between ‘urban 
bias’ in African economic policies and elite fears for political organization by urban citizens. They 
argue that in particular food prices are kept low at the expense of the agricultural sector to prevent 
possible militant actions by the urban workforce. Adverse economic shocks, seemingly primarily 
affecting urban areas, also occurred with the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programs in 
developing countries. Whereas Walton & Seddon (1994) investigated which factors can account for 
where protests were most likely to occur, Bratton & van de Walle (1997) focus on the factors that 
condition the actual outcomes such as regime transitions in Africa, which is actually what most 
observers should be more interested in. 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) investigate regime transitions in Africa in the early 1990s. They 
attempt to explain why some countries only liberalized, while others went one step further and 
democratized. They also analyze why several countries did not undertake any reforms or returned 
to authoritarianism after a short transition period. In many countries - but not all - protests against 
the economic impact of SAPs (e.g. the cutting of food subsidies) marked the start of regime 
transition. Yet, as Bratton and van de Walle argue: “[economic forces] helped to create the 
conditions under which political change became possible, but they did not in and of themselves 
trigger or sustain regime transitions or determine the directions the transitions took. […] the onset 
and subsequent trajectory of regime transition depended on the constellation of domestic political 
forces” (1997, p. 272).  
Several arguments support these claims. Austerity programs and protests already started in the 
1970s, yet only led to regime transition in the 1990s. The largest explanatory power for regime 
transition and their eventual results are politico-institutional factors that are to a large extent 
determined by the regime’s history (‘path dependency’). For example: it was crucial that a latent 
democratic opposition ‘captured’ the economic protests and guided these towards demands for 
democratization. In the case of domestic military intervention, the historical role of the military and 
its disposition towards democracy or authoritarianism determines the evolution of regime transition. 
Economic factors alone cannot explain such occurrences. 
                                                     
11
 Scarcity accounts of the Darfur conflict, for example, have also been questioned (see e.g. De Waal, 2007). 
12
 Although one of Homer-Dixon ‘s (1999) causal mechanisms for conflict is when scarcity in remote areas 
induces migration and concentration in cities, leading to congestion and possibly conflict. 
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Bratton and van de Walle clearly show the discrepancy between protest occurrence and regime 
transition or political instability. Economically-inspired protests do not necessarily lead to political 
change. Yet, there are other, contextual factors that can account for this.  
6. Conclusions and Way Forward 
While some progress has been made in improving our understanding of the linkages between 
rising food prices and conflict, several important gaps remain. Firstly, notions of conflict and 
political instability are often used interchangeably, while these concepts and the relationships 
between them remain to some extent vague. The ‘food riot’ concept in particular leads to 
confusion. Although it is popularly seen as a violent rise of the masses, in reality, many peaceful 
events are gathered under this term, while violence is often committed by the state rather than by 
hungry consumers. The term also presupposes that food is the central issue at hand, which does 
not necessarily have to be the case. Many misunderstanding arise from the second gap identified 
in this paper: the uncritical data gathering based on international news reports.  Not only are these 
remarkably inconsistent, they also make use of classifications which are not scientifically 
investigated. Finally, causal mechanisms in the relationship between rising food prices and conflict 
often remain assumptions in the literature and lack empirical foundation. Three crosscutting 
avenues for improvement therefore exist: better concept definitions, better data gathering, and 
more focus on contexts.  
Clearly defined concepts and categorizations of conflict and instability are a necessary foundation 
for research on the linkages between rising food prices and conflict. For (food) protests in 
particular, purposeful categorizations require an enhanced insight in the events that took place on 
the ground. Local news sources for data gathering can prove to be more reliable than Western 
(English) media to accomplish this. Event descriptions are also likely to be more detailed in local 
sources, which allows for a first-hand qualitative analysis of causes and context. 
As international food prices are likely to remain high, improving our understanding of the causal 
mechanisms which can lead to conflict remains crucial. We can draw important lessons from the 
literature on poverty and conflict, resource scarcity and conflict, and regime transition in Africa. The 
causal role of economic factors alone has continuously been questioned, and ‘context’ or prevailing 
political, economic, and social factors play a crucial role in the conflict outcome. The argument that 
adverse economic shocks seem more of a trigger to conflict rather than an important cause is not 
particularly remarkable in itself. Yet while many authors acknowledge this, the focus often remains 
on the trigger. Resource scarcity, climate change, population growth, or food insecurity often 
remain the starting point of analyses, with researchers consequently tracing the divergent 
(theoretical) possibilities for conflict. In the end, most admit that these factors do not automatically 
lead to conflict everywhere, and stress the importance of context. Because the theoretical 
possibilities for conflict are so large, however, the context factor remains rather understudied with 
as most agreed upon notions that elements of ‘grievance’ and ‘collective action’ are required. 
It is hence important to focus more on the ‘contexts’ that can lead to conflict and, in doing so, to 
make the distinction between different forms of conflict. This also implies a data collection exercise. 
Contextual data are currently collected at the aggregate, national level, and only on a yearly basis, 
which can lead to spurious relations. While the use of these variables is increasingly questioned in 
civil war studies, we can also doubt their strength in the study of highly localized, one-time events 
such as riots. I particularly make the case for ‘bringing politics back in’. The policies taken by the 
government are crucial in the violent escalation of social conflict (e.g. accommodation versus 
repression), but the only variable currently in use to explain state behaviour seems to be the 
country-level regime type variable (Polity IV or Freedom House), which is also used with regards to 
highly localized conflicts. Other ways in which politics matter, can be the strength of the political 
CRPD Working Paper No. 17 
19 
 
opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, for example, was probably better organized than 
other opposition groups to make use of economic unrest.  
Does this mean that triggers should be ignored completely? Not exactly. Although many possible 
triggers exist, some areas are more vulnerable to certain triggers than others, for example 
droughts in the Sahel versus international food price shocks affecting primarily well-connected 
urban areas (see e.g. the case of Niger). A closer look at local-level food prices (and the 
combination with other economic variables such as poverty or inequality) can therefore still provide 
valuable insights because they incorporate the effects of multiple triggers. 
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